Abstract Vulnerabilities in third-party libraries is a growing concern for the software developer, as it poses risks not only to the software client itself but to the entire software ecosystem. To mitigate these risks, developers are strongly recommended to update their dependencies. Recent studies show that affected developers are not likely to respond to the vulnerability threat. However, another reason for the lag of vulnerability updates is due to slow repackaging (i.e., package the vulnerability fix into a new version) and delivery (i.e., affected client adopt the new version) of the fix. To understand these lags of updates, we use both qualitative and quantitative approaches to conduct an empirical study on how 188 fixes were repackaged and delivered across over eight hundred thousand releases of npm software clients hosted on GitHub. We report two lags: (1) lags in repackaging occur as vulnerability fixes are more likely to be bundled with other non-related updates (i.e., about 83.33% of commits are not related to the fix) and (2) lags in the delivery are caused by clients that are more likely to adopt the minor fix than adopt the patch fix. Furthermore, other factors such as downstream dependencies and severity do have an impact. We also find that freshness of packages does not impact the amount of lags. The identification of these two lags opens up different avenues on how to facilitate faster fix delivery throughout a library ecosystem.
Introduction
Vulnerabilities in third-party libraries is a growing concern for the software developer. There is evidence in a 2018 report, where over four million vulnerabilities were alerted in over 500 thousand GitHub repositories (GitHub, 2018a) . The risk of vulnerabilities is not only restricted to their software clients, but it also extends to the entire library ecosystem (Decan et al, 2018; Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017) . Examples include the shellshock (Bennett, 2014) and heartbleed (Synopsys, 2014) bugs. To mitigate these risks, developers are strongly recommended to update their dependencies (Kula et al, 2018) .
These projects (referred to as packages in the paper) are prone to lags in updating vulnerable dependencies. A recent study shows that affected developers are not likely to respond to a vulnerability threat as the updating process involves much planning, such as managing the triage and allocating developers to address the threat (Kula et al, 2018) . Complementary studies depict developers having slow reactions to updating (Bavota et al, 2015; Bogart et al, 2016; Ihara et al, 2017) . Another reason for the lag of dependency updates is due to slow repackaging (i.e., package the vulnerability fix into a new version) and fix delivery (i.e., affected client adopt the new version).
Complementary to related work, the research gap that we aim to fill is not the spread of the vulnerability itself covered by (Decan et al, 2017 (Decan et al, , 2018 Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017; Kula et al, 2018) , but investigate the response and spread of the fix updates throughout the ecosystem. Better understanding of lags helps developers prioritize their vulnerability updates, which leads to faster vulnerability mitigation.
In this study, we conduct a quantitative study on the lag of updates (i.e., repackaging and delivery of the fix). Specifically, we conduct an empirical study on 188 known vulnerability fixes with 882,222 package releases of npm software clients hosted on GitHub. First, lags in the repackaging phase are identified. For each vulnerability, the fix commits are manually identified from vulnerability reports listed on snyk.io. Next, we identify lags in the delivery phase. Since clients may adopt a later version of the package that also includes the fix, the study analyzes adopted versions that actually bundle the fix to clients. Finally, we analyze ecosystem factors that impact the lag when adopting fixes.
Results indicate lags in the repackaging, as vulnerability fixes are more likely to be bundled with non-related updates (i.e., 83.33% of commits were not related to the fix) instead of being released in a special update. For lags in the delivery, clients are more likely to adopt the minor fix than the patch fix. The study finds that other factors such as proximity to the vulnerable package (i.e., downstream dependencies) and the severity of the vulnerability (i.e., severity) impact the lag. It also shows that whether a client uses the latest version of packages (i.e., freshness) does not impact the lag. The identification of these two lags and their implications opens up different avenues for both researchers and practitioners to investigate, especially on how to facilitate faster fix delivery throughout a library ecosystem.
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Vulnerability is reported
The distribution of vulnerability fixes The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic concepts of package updating and the lag of updates for a vulnerability fix. Section 3 motivates our research questions, with Section 4 describing the approaches. Section 5 presents results of the study. We then discuss implications of our results and challenges for the future in Section 6, with Section 7 showing threats to validity of the study. Section 8 shows the related works. Finally, Section 9 concludes the study.
Basic Concepts and Definitions
In this section, we introduce the repackage and delivery process for a vulnerability fix across the software ecosystem. Concretely, a real-world example will be used to illustrate this process.
Repackage and Delivery of a Vulnerability Fix
As shown in Figure 1 , the repackaging and delivery process consists of three phases:
-Phase 1: Vulnerability Awareness. Developers of the vulnerable package become aware of the vulnerability report from sources (e.g., GitHub issue (Bill, 2012) , Snyk.io (Snyk, 2017) ).
Fig. 2:
A vulnerability report for package socket.io reported in GitHub issue due to the insecure randomness vulnerability.
-Phase 2: Vulnerability Fix Repackaging. Developers spend their effort to fix the vulnerability, then repackage and release the fix as a new version. -Phase 3: Vulnerability Fix Delivery. Clients adopt the vulnerability fix delivered from the required package, then repackage the fix and deliver their new update to each of their clients.
Phase 1: Vulnerability Awareness. Figure 2 is an example of a vulnerability report. This is where lags begin. Phase 1 is triggered when developers become aware of vulnerabilities in this report. The end of Phase 1 is triggered by developers responding to the threat. Developers discuss with vulnerability reporters to identify which code changes are required. Developers are then assigned to create the fix. Note that assigned developers can also be reporters.
Phase 2: Vulnerability Fix Repackaging. Phase 2 is concerned with repackaging fixes in a new release. This phase is separated into three steps; (i) fixing process, (ii) reviewing process, and (iii) releasing process. The fixing process starts after developers have identified and corrected the vulnerable code. Figure 3 and Figure 4 are examples of commit that related to the fixes. The fix reviewing process is then performed to confirm correctness and coding style. If the fix is accepted, it will be repackaged and merged to the repository (i.e., master branch) similar to Figure 3 . On the other hand, subsequent discussions may be required to improve fix correctness.
The end of Phase 2 is marked by a new version release, which is incremented and should follow semantic versioning (semver) rules (Preston-Werner, 2009) for npm packages. Phase 3: Vulnerability Fix Delivery. Phase 3 essentially allows downstream clients to adopt the fix. Downstream clients refer to clients that both directly and indirectly (transitive) depend on a package. This phase starts after the fixes have been adopted by clients, thus patching the vulnerability. In some cases, the semver allows the package manager to automatically update the library, especially if the constraints are met. However, there are cases where the fixes cannot be adopted due to incompatable code. Hence, developers require migration effort to facilitate successful adoption.
The end of Phase 3 is when the adoption is successful. As shown in Figure  1 , projects with downstream clients will then return to Phase 2 for repacking the fixes. Phase 2 and Phase 3 will continue throughout the ecosystem until the vulnerability threat has been eliminated from the ecosystem.
Motivation & Research Questions
There have been only a few works focusing on the response to vulnerabilities. Developers use security practices to aid in the (i) prevention, (ii) detection, and (iii) response to vulnerabilities in deployed products (Williams et al, 2018) . Recent research has focused on the two security practices on prevention and the detection of vulnerabilities in the ecosystem (Hejderup, 2015; Howard and Leblanc, 2001; Munaiah et al, 2017; Nguyen et al, 2016; Pashchenko et al, 2018; Ponta et al, 2018) .
The research gap that we address is the response to the vulnerability, which is understanding what lags occur during the delivery of the fix into the ecosystem. We propose that there is the lag of updates issues (i.e., when the vulnerability fix response is delayed). The following three research questions are formulated:
3.1 (RQ 1 ) How are vulnerability fixes repackaged?
We compliment the recent of works that have studied the threat of the vulnerability (Decan et al, 2018; Hejderup, 2015) . Both works showed how the vulnerability threat can affect the ecosystem network and how the fix is spread throughout the ecosystem. In this study, we focus on how the spread of the fix could be hindered, causing lags. Specifically, we would like to study how the fix is repackaged and whether there are potential lags during this phase. Therefore, (RQ 1 ) investigates how vulnerability fixes are repackaged and how lags could occur in the repackaging phase.
3.2 (RQ 2 ) In terms of the release versioning, when do vulnerability fixes get delivered and adopted?
In light of the incident with the package event-stream in 2018, we know that downstream clients incurred lags of at least a week due to the inactivity of developers (Sparling, 2018) . In this case, the knowledge of which package version was safe to adopt was a reason for the lag. Hence, (RQ 2 ) investigates what version do fixes get adopted by clients.
3.3 (RQ 3 ) Does dependency freshness of clients reduce lags in the fix adoption?
(RQ 3 ) investigates whether freshness of the client's dependency impacts the lag in adopting the fix. First introduced by Cox et al (2015) , we explore whether the freshness (i.e., latest versions) of the vulnerable package impacts lags in the fix. Furthermore, Decan et al (2018) showed that freshness of the updated dependency reduces the technical lag. We analyze the freshness through the lens of (a) in-direct downstream clients as Kikas et al (2017) revealed that vulnerabilities not only affect a single package but also any other downstream clients and (b) severity as Decan et al (2018) showed how the severity vulnerability may impact the lag.
Research Approaches
In this section, we present our data collection and research approaches in order to answer our three research questions. First, the collection of the dataset is presented. Then in subsequent sections, we discuss in detail each approach, data processing and analysis of the results.
Data Collection
The dataset is acquired from two different sources, (i) library packages in the software ecosystem and (ii) vulnerability reports of packages. We selected the npm JavaScript ecosystem (NPM, 2010) as it hosts one of the largest collection of packages and has been the target of recent studies (Abdalkareem et al, 2017; Decan et al, 2017 Decan et al, , 2018 Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017) . To extract ecosystem information of dependencies, similarly to Wittern et al (2016) , we use the npm registry to download an offline copy of the npm ecosystem. The package.json meta-file is extracted to retrieve packages information in the repository, including the semantic versioning information for each package.
For the vulnerability reports, we use the snyk.io website to extract vulnerabilities that were originally reported in the CVE and CWE databases. At the time of study, snyk.io had a comprehensive list of vulnerabilities that are linked to npm packages. Additionally, snyk.io also provides GitHub references for more detailed information (e.g., submitted issues, fix commits, pull request). To match the GitHub repositories to the vulnerability, we first only selected vulnerability that already released a fix. Then, we used the package name and references to match the report with the downloaded repository automatically.
As shown in Table 1 , we collected vulnerability reports that disclosed from 9 April 2009 to 16 November 2016 with 792 reports. For package repositories from GitHub, we used repository snapshot from 17 December 2017 with 154,425 repositories. Note that two sets of data have a one year lag since we want to capture more than 90% of the released fixes according to the study of Decan et al (2018) . After filtering the vulnerability reports that do not release any fixes, we mapped 42,980 repositories (including all downstream clients) with 188 vulnerability reports.
Research Method for RQ 1
Approach. The approach to answer (RQ 1 ) involves the reconstruction of the repackaging and delivery of vulnerability fix process (See Figure 1) . Since all downloaded repositories are from GitHub, we investigated Issue, Commit and Pull Requests that are mentioned in the vulnerability report. Figure 5 is an example of vulnerability information and how they are linked to the vulnerable GitHub repository. The first step is the extraction of these linkages (i.e., explicit links to the Issue, Commit or Pull Request) that are listed in the snyk.io vulnerability report. The links extracted are captured into three types: Issue (i.e., Figure 2 ), Commit (i.e., Figure 4 ), and Pull request (i.e., Figure 3 ). Based on the links, we are able to identify the vulnerable version and is used to search for the vulnerable code commit.
To validate that developers knowingly applied the fix, two authors manually confirmed that comments in the commit log or pull request (i.e., one author found the evidence and the other validated). By using this method, we were also able to discern whether fixes were applied specifically to fix the vulnerability, or were bundled with other changes. Using this method, we were able to distinguish between commits that fixed the vulnerability. Figure 6 is the GitHub comparing changes tool (Sencha Labs, 2018) that we used to confirm the set of commits that released in a fix update. By using the tool and checking the comments, we then were able to manually labeled commits as either (1) fix commits or (2) other commits. The information about the fix commits and other commits is used for the following analysis to answer the (RQ 1 ).
Prepared Dataset. The prepared dataset involves a manual investigation of the vulnerability reports. Since the approach requires a link, we only include the report that has at least one GitHub Pull request or Commit link. Thus, our final dataset included 131 vulnerability reports. Analysis. Table 2 shows the metrics that we use to investigate the lag of updates in the vulnerability fix repackaging phase. There are two kinds of dimension in our metrics, including (i) package version labels and (ii) contents of the repackaged fix. For the package version labels, we consider the labeled release version (i.e., package major, package minor and package patch) to understand how developers release the fix update. Note that pre-releases or special releases are not considered in this study.
For the repackaging metrics, we count how much of fixes get repackaged in each release commit. The metrics include counting the fix and release commits as the fix is being delivered downstream the clients. The final metric is then the proportion of fix commits over the release commits. We then visualize this proportion using the bar chart.
Research Method for RQ 2
Approach. Our approach to answer (RQ 2 ) is an investigation of lags in the fix delivery phase. We first extract any clients that are dependent on the vulnerable library. Similar to (Wittern et al, 2016) , we extract "dependencies", "version", and "name" attributes from the package.json meta-file.
Once we identify the fix each vulnerable client, we then track how many clients adopt the fix. In detail, we inspect the commit history of clients to extract meta-data of the vulnerable version and the fix update of clients (e.g., client version, library version, fix release date).
Prepared Dataset. The prepared dataset involves a fix being published. Thus, from the 131 vulnerability reports used in (RQ 1 ), we filter out reports that that do not report a fix. We then classify the vulnerable packages according to the labeled semantic versioning published by the developers (major.minor.patch). Table 3 shows the filtering out packages that did not follow semantic versioning. Our key assumption is that clients that utilized the semantic versioning (i.e., releasing major, minor or patch versions) are more likely to follow the semantic version. As a result, 7,141 packages were filtered out from the dataset. This pre-processing helps to remove any bias in the data. In the end, The clients that adopted the fix are classified into the following (i) client major : clients release a version that may have incompatible API changes, (ii) client minor : clients release a version that should have backward-compatible manner, (iii) client patch: clients release a version that should have backwardcompatible fixes. Finally, we added another classification, (iv) client removed : where the client deemed to remove the dependency from the release.
We use visualizations and statistics to draw conclusions about lags in the delivery phase. We use box-plots and report the median values for visualizing trends how long it takes for clients to adopt the delivered fixes. In order to statistically validate the differences in the results, we apply Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric statistical test (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) . Our hypothesis is that "clients tend to adopt fixes according to the same semver (e.g., package major are likely to be adopted by client majors)". To support each hypothesis, we investigate the effect size using Cliff's δ, which is a non-parametric effect size measure Romano et al (2006) suggests, effect size is analyzed as follows: (1) |δ| < 0.147 as Negligible, (2) 
Research Method for RQ 3
Approach. Our approach to answer (RQ 3 ) is to classify the freshness of clients and then use the histories to identify lags in the delivery of the fix. Figure 7 depicts the classification used to detect the freshness of the dependent client. As shown in the Figure, in the (1) Latest Lineage (LL) -the client has adopted any version of the package that has the latest updates or (2) Supported Lineage (SL) -the client has adopted a version that is not as fresh and is outdated. In the example, v1.0.2, v1.0.3 and v1.1.3 are SL versions. Different from (RQ 2 ), for each vulnerable library, we transverse and identify all downstream clients. In related work, it is referred to as transitive Kikas et al (2017) or Hejderup (2015) indirect dependencies. A breadth-first search (BFS) approach is adopted as it able to find the shortest path to reach all downstream clients.
Prepared Dataset. The prepared dataset involves extracting all downstream clients that adopted the package fix. Dataset preparation of (RQ 3 ) consists of two steps. First, we searched for all downstream clients that depended on the vulnerable library listed in 188 reports. We then filtered out vulnerabilities that did not have a fix released. In the end, (RQ 3 ) consists of 136 vulnerability reports with 74 different vulnerable packages and a total of 19,583 different downstream clients.
Analysis. Our analysis to answer (RQ 3 ) involves an empirical analysis through two lenses: -Downstream Dependencies: refers to the transitive dependency distance between a vulnerable library and any downstream clients (i.e., 1, 2, 3 and ≥ 4). -Severity (H, M, L): refers to severity of vulnerability (i.e., H = high, M = medium, L = low) as indicated in the report (See Figure 5) .
We use visualizations and statistics to draw our conclusions. We use boxplots and report the median values for visualizing trends to compare how long it takes for LL and SL clients adopt the delivered fix. Furthermore, we group results by severity and downstream in-direct clients. Similar to (RQ 2 ), in order to statistically validate the differences in the results, we apply KruskalWallis non-parametric statistical test. We test the hypothesis that "clients Other commits Fix commits % of commits in a release with fresher dependencies are likely to experience less lags". We also apply Cliff's δ to see the effect size.
Results
In this section, we present the results for (RQ 1 ), (RQ 2 ), and (RQ 3 ). The results include key findings and then finally answers each research question.
5.1 (RQ 1 ) How are vulnerability fixes repackaged? Table 4 and Figure 8 show two findings: that (i) vulnerability fixes are often repackaged and released as patches and (ii) vulnerability fixes are repackaged as a minor part of the update. Table 4 shows that there are 57.25% of vulnerability fixes repackaged in a patch update. On the other hand, there are 6.87% and 35.88% of fixes released as a major update and a minor update respectively. This evidence indicates that vulnerability fixes are likely to repackage in the patch update than the others. From the example of the faye patch fix 2,3 that fixes the insecure defaults, there is only one commit that updates the default value of variables 4 . However, this patch also includes the other fix 5 (i.e., fixing mutable variable usage inside a closure). Figure 8 shows that the average (i.e., median) of the percentage of the fix commits per release is 0.83%, 1.01%, and 16.67% for major, minor, and patch update respectively. In more detail, we find that the average size of the fix in terms of the line of code is eight lines. From the example of the npm 6 that vulnerable to symlink attack due to predictable tmp folder names. It has seven lines of code for fixing the vulnerability 7 . Based on our results, we now return to answer the research question (RQ 1 ) How are vulnerability fixes repackaged?:
Repackaged vulnerability fixes constitute for a small portion of commits in a release. We find that (i) the vulnerability fixes are often released as patch fix and (ii) 83.33% of commits in the repackaged fix are not related to the vulnerability fix.
5.2 (RQ 2 ) In terms of the release versioning, when do vulnerability fixes get delivered and adopted? Table 5, Table 6 , and Figure 9 show two findings: (i) the repackaged fixes tend to be released as patches and (ii) clients tend to adhere to semantic versioning when packages deliver major and minor fixes. Table 5 shows that the majority of repackaged fixes are released as patches (46 out of the 75 delivered fixes). Putting together the results of (RQ 1 ), we can say that although the fix is coupled with other commits, it is more likely to be released as a patch. To see the reason why some packages released the fix as a major update, we investigate three packages including connect 8 , knockout 9 , and ws 10 . From the example of connect, developers were repackaged a lot of updates (e.g., vulnerability fix, testing, documentation) before released a new major version 11 . From the example of knockout, developers planned to create a new feature of the package, so they made an update to support more secured processing in the package 12 . From the example of ws, developers have a long discussion about the fix of vulnerability since it might affect the performance of the package. In the end, they decided to merged the fix for the major release 13 .
In terms of the client release, Table 5 and Figure 9 show that clients tend to adopt fixes according to the same semantic versioning as the packages in cases of package major (87.88%) and package minor (60.93%). However, in the case of package patch, client patch is not a popular option (4.22%) since clients tend to adopt the fix in major (22.14%) and minor (25.70%) releases. It also implies that clients are more likely to release the package as a minor release than as a patch release. We speculate that there may be some migration effort that is required to integrate the fix into the client package. Another interesting observation is that for the three packages that released their fix in a major release, the client was more likely to release their fix as a major revision or simply remove the dependency altogether.
For the statistical evaluation, we tested our hypothesis whether "clients tend to adopt fixes according to the same semver (e.g., package major are likely to be adopted by client majors)". Table 6 shows that clients adopt fixes according to the same semantic versioning when packages deliver either major or minor fix as the effect size to the other adoptions are large. On the other hand, it is unclear that clients adopt a patch when packages deliver patch fixes as the effect size to other adoptions are low. Also, the median of client minor is higher than client patch when packages deliver patch fixes.
Based on our results, we now return to answer research question (RQ 2 ) In terms of the release versioning, when do vulnerability fixes get delivered and adopted? :
Repackaged fixes are likely to be released as package patches, and clients are more likely to adopt and release them as minor releases. Clients also tend to adhere to semantic versioning when packages deliver major and minor fixes.
5.3 (RQ 3 ) Does dependency freshness of clients reduce lags in the fix adoption? Table 7, Table 8 , and Figure 10 show that dependency freshness does not impact the amount of lags in fix adoption. Instead, we find that (i) clients further downstream are more likely to adopt the fix slower when vulnerabilities affect the latest lineage, and (ii) fixes with a medium vulnerability suffers the most lags. Figure 10 shows that there are differences in the lags between the Latest Lineage (LL) and the Supported Lineage (SL). However, the freshness does not impact the amount of lags since the results are different depends on the severity. In fact, we notice more trends in terms of the downstream dependencies and the severity of the vulnerability. Interestingly, this result indicates that adoption time decreases (i.e., fewer lags of updates) for clients that are further downstream as shown in Table 7 . Table 8 shows that downstream clients adopt the fix slower (i.e., more lags of updates) when a vulnerability affects the Latest Lineage, especially for high and medium severity. In the case of low severity, downstream clients quickly adopt fixes (i.e., fewer lags of updates) when the vulnerability affects the Latest Lineage.
For the statistical evaluation, we tested our hypothesis whether "clients with fresher dependencies are likely to experience less lags". The lag of updates (days) (c) Low severity and 1-2 for high severity). However, only clients that affected by low severity vulnerability accept our hypothesis. It also shows that the effect sizes of the differences are noticeable (i.e., medium to large).
Based on our results, we now return to answer the research question (RQ 3 ) Does dependency freshness of clients reduce lags in the fix adoption? :
Dependency freshness does not reduce the lags in the fix adoption. We find that (i) downstream clients affected by low severity vulnerabilities tends to suffer fewer lags and (ii) fixes with a medium vulnerability suffers the most lags. In cases of high and medium severity, the latest lineage tends to suffer more lags. However, the supported lineage tends to suffer more lags when clients affected by low severity. .
Implications
This section discusses three main implications based on our results in (RQ 1 ), (RQ 2 ), and (RQ 3 ). From the results, we propose the following actionable implications. Npm developers consider the release cycle when releasing vulnerability fixes. According to the results of (RQ 1 ), vulnerability fixes are minor with less than 16.67% of commits in new update related to the vulnerability fix. We suspect that vulnerability fix repackaging is a cause for lags. Hence, developers of the vulnerable packages are recommended to release fixes as soon as they have applied the fix, if not they should highlight these fixes when packaging the fix. Additionally, from ten randomly selected vulnerabilities, we found that discussions between developers did not include explicit mention of the vulnerability (i.e., GitHub Issue, Commit and Pull request). Since developers repackaged the fix with other updates, developers may have been unaware. Not in the scope of this study, a developer survey may prove useful in us to how developers perceive repackaging of vulnerabilities. Based on our study, treatment of vulnerability fixes as special updates might be a potential solution and may facilitate faster delivery into the ecosystem.
Npm developers should clearly highlight the security fix for clients. According to (RQ 1 ) and (RQ 2 ), vulnerability fixes are released as a patch (i.e., 57.25% of the fixes). However, clients are more likely to adopt the fixes by updating their library major and minor versions (i.e., 19.17% and 22.67%) than the patch version (i.e., 4.88%). Security fixes need to be highlighted in the fix, as a possible reason is for failure to update because client developers are more interested in major features that are highlighted in an update. Recently, some open source communities start to make tools to highlight the vulnerability problems in the software ecosystem. GitHub (GitHub, 2017) made a new function for notifying the new vulnerability from the dependency list of clients. Also, npm (NPM, 2018) made a new command for listing the vulnerability information in downloaded dependencies of clients. Therefore as stated in (RQ 1 ), explicit patches identification and highlighting of the security vulnerability is needed to speed up delivery.
Dependency freshness does not impact the lags. From our first finding of (RQ 3 ), downstream clients tend to adopt quicker. A possible reason is developers of downstream clients have more time to plan and prepare their projects before fixes are available to adopt. Thus, future work into immediate awareness of clients to the vulnerable library may reduce lags. The second finding of (RQ 3 ), high and medium severity vulnerability fixes get adopted slower if vulnerabilities affect the latest version. Hence, the time for adopting the vulnerability fix is higher due to the complexity of updates. The third finding of (RQ 3 ), the severity of vulnerability impact lags of updates. It implies that severity is an important factor in the lag of updates. According to the official documentation of npm (NPM, 2016) , when a security threat is identified, the following severity policy is put into action:
-P0: Drop everything and fix! -P1: High severity, schedule work within 7 days.
-P2: Medium severity, schedule work within 30 days.
-P3: Low severity, fix within 180 days.
Surprisingly, our results show evidence that low severity fixes are adopted just as quick as high severity fixes. A possible reason for the quicker adopting of low severity could be because the fix is easier to integrate into the application. A potential future work would be the estimation of lags (i.e., days) based on these factors. Although not in the scope of this study, it is seen as immediate future work.
Challenges for the future. According to our results, we need more empirical evidence to find more factors that influence the lag of updates. Additionally, we need a developer survey to better understanding the reason for developers to repackaged the vulnerability fix and their awareness of the lag of updates. In the future, we can use the evidence from the survey to create a tool for library developers, for example, making a special branch for fixing the vulnerability specifically or generating a release note that highlight vulnerability fixes automatically. According to the report from blackducksofware.com (Black Duck Software, 2018) , there is an excess of vulnerabilities were reported to developers. The result is developers do not know which vulnerabilities should fix first in order to minimize the time for fixing. Hence, this work serves as evidence and a starting point for understanding how developers are responding to security vulnerability fixes. The visualization of related fixes and non-fixes in the package can give an idea of the migration effort needed to reduce lags. In the future, the tool for prioritizing the vulnerabilities can be created based on the description of each vulnerability and the vulnerable codes.
Threats to Validity
Key threats to the study were classified as either internal and external threats.
Internal Validity. Internal threats to validity refer to the concerns that are internal to the study. We discuss four threats. The first threat is the correctness of tools and techniques used in this study. We use the listed dependencies and version number as defined in the package.json meta-file. The threat is that sometimes some dependencies are not listed or semantic version is invalid and vice-versa. However, we applied a filter to remove clients that do not follow the semantic versioning. We believe that the threats of invalid data are minimal. The second threat is the tools used to collect and implement our defined terminology. We used python libraries numpy, scipy, gitpython, and semanticversion. To mitigate this, we carefully confirmed our results by manually validating the results for (RQ 1 ) and (RQ 2 ), then also manually validating some of the results with the listed dependencies and dependent statistics on the npm website. For the existing tool for suggesting the fixed version like npm-audit, we found that this tool was inappropriate to use in this work due to its limitation. The first limitation is that package-lock.json file is required for analyzing repositories. We found that only 2.27% of repositories in this work have that file. The second one is that the tool always uses the latest information from the server for the suggestion. Unlike our work, we analyzed the data available in the historical snapshot.
The third threat is the sample size of the analyzed data. In this study, we analyzed only 188 vulnerability reports from 792 listed reports on snyk.io. This small size of sample data might not be able to represent the population. However, the authors manually validate the data for (RQ 1 ) and (RQ 2 ). We believe that our validation improves the reliability of the results.
As the correctness of dependency relations is dependent on getting all dependencies, the final internal threat is the validity of our collected data. In this study, our ecosystem is made up of packages and clients that were either or affected directly or transitively by at least a single vulnerability. We also consider only normal dependencies listed in the package.json file to make sure that the packages are used by clients not only for testing. Hence, other types of dependencies including: (1) devDependencies, (2) peerDependencies, (3) bundledDependencies, and (4) optionalDependencies are ignored in this study. We are confident that the result of (RQ 3 ) are not affected by invalid data.
External Validity. External threats to validity refer to the generalization concerns of the study's results. The main external threat is the generality of other results to other ecosystems. In this study, we focused solely on the npm JavaScript ecosystem. However, our analysis is applicable to other ecosystems that have similar package management system (e.g., PyPI for Python, Maven for Java). Immediate future plans include studying the lags in other ecosystems.
Related Work
Complementary the related work introduced throughout the paper, in this section, we discuss some key related work with respect to updating software libraries, malware and vulnerabilities, and mining-related studies.
On Updating Libraries
These studies relate to the migration of libraries to the latest versions of libraries. With new libraries and newer versions of existing libraries continuously being released, managing a system's library dependencies is a concern on its own. As outlined in related studies (Bogart et al, 2016; Raemaekers et al, 2012; Teyton et al, 2012) , dependency management includes making cost-benefit decisions related to keeping or updating dependencies on outdated libraries. Additionally, studies show that updating libraries and their APIs are slow and lagging (Bavota et al, 2015; Hora et al, 2015; Ihara et al, 2017; Robbes et al, 2012; Sawant et al, 2016) . This study found that such update decisions are not only influenced by whether or not security vulnerabilities have been fixed and important features have been improved, but also by the amount of work required to accommodate changes in the API of a newer library version. Recently, there also have been other work that studies dependency issues at the ecosystem level (Abdalkareem et al, 2017; Decan et al, 2017; Mirhosseini and Parnin, 2017) .
Our work complements the findings of prior work, with the goal of encouraging developers to update. Different from prior work, we focus on the lag of vulnerability fix updates, with the aim of assisting developers to plan their updates.
On Malware and Vulnerabilities
These studies relate to security vulnerability within the software ecosystem from various aspects. Recent studies try to look at the impact of vulnerability within the ecosystem by looking at dependencies usage (Decan et al, 2018; Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017; Lauinger et al, 2017; Linares-Vásquez et al, 2017) . These results show that vulnerability able to affect the wide range of clients in the ecosystem. There is a study about the relationship between bugs and vulnerabilities, to conclude that the relationship is weak (Munaiah et al, 2017) . In order to increase the awareness of developers to the security vulnerability, some studies try to create a tool to detect and alert vulnerability when it disclosed (Cadariu et al, 2015; GitHub, 2018b) . There is a study about addressing the over-estimation problem for reporting the vulnerable dependencies in open source communities and the impact of vulnerable libraries usage in the industry (Pashchenko et al, 2018) . Additionally, some studies try to predict the vulnerability of software system by analyzing source code (Alhazmi et al, 2007; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin and Williams, 2008) .
Our work builds from these prior work, focusing on how vulnerability fixes can be repackaged, delivered, and adopted quicker in the ecosystem. Different from prior work, we focus on the repackaging process of fixes in the commit level instead of the release level. We also look at the time to adopt the fix in downstream dependencies with the freshness of adopted packages, unlike the prior work that looks at direct dependencies only.
Mining-related studies
These studies relate to the mining technique in the software repository and software ecosystem. The first step of software repository mining is data collection and extraction. Researchers need to have the data sources and know about which part of the data can use in their work. In the case of the npm package repository, we can extract the information of packages from package.json meta-file (Mirhosseini and Parnin, 2017; Wittern et al, 2016) . In the case of the security vulnerability, we can collect data from Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) (Mitre Corporation, 2018b) and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) (Mitre Corporation, 2018a) database (Alhazmi et al, 2007; Cadariu et al, 2015; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Lauinger et al, 2017; Linares-Vásquez et al, 2017; Munaiah et al, 2017) . To study the issues within the software ecosystem, we also define the traversal of the downstream clients by using the dependency list of clients. These studies introduce some technique to model the dependency graph (Bavota et al, 2015; Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017) .
As shown we use similar mining techniques to extract the dependencies as well as construct the ecosystem. Different from prior work, we have different motivations and goals.
Conclusion
Developers in the software ecosystem now have over a thousand libraries at their fingertips, attributed by large networks of dependent packages that provide the functionality to any client application. In this study, we use the case study of npm JavaScript ecosystem with the vulnerability report from snyk.io to understand how clients respond to the fix and how fast it is spread. Based on our results, we conclude that:
-lags in repackaging occur as vulnerability fixes are more likely to be bundled with other non-related updates (i.e., about 16.7% of commits are related to the fix). -lags in the delivery are caused by clients that are more likely to adopt the minor fix than adopt the patch fix. -other factors such as downstream dependencies and severity do have an impact on lags.
The identification of these two lags and their implications opens up different avenues for both researchers and practitioners to investigate. We envision our work to bring insights that work towards reducing lags.
